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The participants now wore red-green glasses, however, making them unaware of the difference from the previous ambiguous stimulus. They were told they would be presented with the same ambiguous RDK as in the first run, and that just the use of red-green glasses would strongly bias rotation perception towards one direction. The depth cues were consistent with this dominant direction in 80% of total viewing time and reversed unpredictably and unbeknownst to the observers with a frequency based on the reversal rate during the ambiguous baseline run. In a second learning run, the red-green glasses were switched, which reversed the perceptual bias. As expected, perception was strongly biased by the depth cues, resulting in significantly longer average phase durations of rotation in the dominant direction (Figure 1 B,C; t(9) = 9.9, p < 0.0005). While the participants believed that this was just an effect of the red-green glasses, it was actually due to the stimulus manipulation.
During the subsequent test phase, participants again wore the red-green glasses and were told that the two following runs were identical to the Expectations have been shown to be powerful modulators of pain [1] and emotion [2] in placebo studies. In such experiments, expectations are induced by instructions combined with manipulation of the sensory experience that is unknown to the subjects. After an expectation learning phase where a painful stimulation is surreptitiously lowered following placebo application, the placebo effectively reduces subjective pain intensity in a subsequent test phase [3] . The strength of this placebo effect is closely related to the induced expectation [4] . Here, we asked whether this powerful cognitive bias reflects a general property of sensory information processing and tested whether the contents of visual awareness could be altered by a placebo-like expectation manipulation. We found a dramatic effect of experimentally induced expectations on the perception of an ambiguous visual motion stimulus. This shows that expectations have a strong and general influence on our experience of the sensory input independently of its specific type and content.
Ten healthy human observers participated in a behavioral experiment where they viewed a random-dot kinematogram (RDK) that is perceived as a cylinder rotating in depth despite the absence of depth cues (Figure 1 ) [5] . The rotation direction is ambiguous, resulting in bistable perception with spontaneous direction reversals every few seconds. Participants had to report perceptual reversals, and to indicate the level of perceptual confidence (high-confidence, low-confidence or uncertain) by pressing different keys. During an ambiguous baseline run, average durations of perceived right-and leftward rotation did not differ ( Figure 1A ; t(9) = 0.79, p = 0.45, paired two-tailed t-test). In the subsequent expectation learning phase, participants viewed a different version of the RDK in which ambiguity was minimized through the provision of red-green three-dimensional depth cues [5] . preceding runs. While therefore again expecting a strong bias towards one rotation direction, they were now unknowingly presented with completely ambiguous stimuli lacking any depth cues, as in the baseline run. Strikingly, perception was still strongly biased towards the expected direction ( Figure  1D ,E; t(9) = 3.4, p < 0.008) which, in the absence of depth cues, was purely due to the expectation induced by the learning phase. This expectationinduced perceptual bias was stable across the entire test phase (see Figure  S1 in the Supplemental data available on-line with this issue). In a final ambiguous baseline without red-green glasses, no difference was observed between durations of right-and leftward rotation ( Figure 1F ; t(9) = 0.13, p = 0.90).
Did participants truly perceive what they reported during the test phase or were they just reporting what they expected? Such a response bias should have led to an increase in expected percepts at the expense of low-confidence or uncertain percepts. However, the proportions of low confidence and uncertain percepts did not differ from the baseline runs (t(9) = -0.5, p = 0.66 and t(9) = -0.9, Color-tuned neurons have recently been found in posterior inferior temporal cortex of the macaque monkey, clustered within millimeter-sized modules dubbed globs, downstream from V1 and V2 [19, 20] . We determined the color tuning of the population of glob cells described in that study (Figure 1) . Although neurons tuned to all directions in color space were found [20] , the population distribution was not uniform, and is markedly different from that obtained in LGN or V1. The population distribution contains three prominent peaks. The largest peak aligns with red; the second largest, with green; and the third, with blue. The distribution also includes a bulge that peaks in the yellow. These peaks are roughly consistent with unique colors identified by human subjects (symbols, Figure 1 ). The three prominent peaks also correspond to the three most saturated colors in the stimulus set (see Figure S1 in the Supplemental data available on-line with this issue); and the size of each of the peaks corresponds to the relative saturations of the hues, suggesting that both hue and saturation are represented by relative number of glob cells. The relative size of each of the peaks also corresponds to the frequency with which these color terms is adopted by language: red is adopted first, then yellow or green, followed by blue [4] . These results extend those of Zeki [21] and Komatsu et al. [22] and are, to our knowledge, the closest explicit neural representation of unique colors in the primate brain.
The stimuli consisted of flashed (200 ms ON/200 ms OFF) optimally shaped bars surrounded by a neutral-adapting gray field. Color tuning was assessed by varying the color of the bar. Three sets of equiluminant colors were used: one set was equiluminant with the adapting-gray field; one set was higher luminance than the adapting field; and one set was lower luminance than it. The population tuning was consistent across stimulus sets, except for a subtle shift in the location of the Neural basis for unique hues Cleo M. Stoughton and Bevil R. Conway All colors can be described in terms of four non-reducible 'unique' hues: red, green, yellow, and blue [1] . These four hues are also the most common 'focal' colors -the best examples of color terms in language [2] . The significance of the unique hues has been recognized since at least the 14 th century [3] and is universal [4, 5] , although there is some individual variation [6, 7] . Psychophysical linking hypotheses predict an explicit neural representation of unique hues at some stage of the visual system, but no such representation has been described [8] . The special status of the unique hues "remains one of the central mysteries of color science" [9] . Here we report that a population of recently identified cells in posterior inferior temporal cortex of macaque monkey contains an explicit representation of unique hues.
Color in humans and macaque monkeys depends on the differential responses of the three cone types -L, M and S -an operation typified by parvocellular neurons of the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus (LGN). LGN cells can be categorized according to color preference, but these categories do not correspond to unique hues [6, 10, 11] . Instead, multi-stage models have been developed, locating the essential color calculation to brain regions subsequent to the LGN in the visual processing hierarchy [12, 13] . Such models describe a recombination of the cone signals to produce color tuning that corresponds to perception, but it is also plausible that the LGN output is simply filtered so that only that minority of LGN cells with appropriate color tuning is routed to color-processing regions of cortex. In either case, neurons downstream of the LGN at the first cortical stages of vision (V1 and V2), are, however, unlikely to encode unique colors [14] [15] [16] [17] : like neurons in the LGN, color-opponent neurons in V1 are tuned to colors lying close to the cardinal color axes defined by cone opponency: L −M (bluish-red),;
